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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper examines the potential role for foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities 
and the associated implications for Treasury security interest rates, international portfolio 
allocations, net international income flows, and the U.S. net international debt position, using a 
baseline outlook of current and projected U.S. budget deficits and growing debt.  The analysis 
applies empirical results regarding the role of U.S. structural budget deficits, and foreign official 
and Federal Reserve holdings of U.S. Treasuries, in determining Treasury security interest rates.  
Although initial review of information suggests that the world portfolio could potentially 
accommodate financing requirements over the intermediate horizon and mitigate interest rate 
effects, substantial uncertainty remains about the relationships among foreign official holdings, 
exchange rates, and trade; the potential effects of “crowding out” in the international portfolio; 
and how and whether world portfolio allocations would adjust to accommodate higher shares of 
U.S. assets. 
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Financing U.S. Debt:  
Is There Enough Money in the World – and At What Cost? 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States and many other advanced economies have long faced fundamental budget and external 
imbalances that, under current policy configurations, are unsustainable in the long run.  Recent sovereign 
debt concerns in Europe, while not fully comparable in nature to those facing the United States, have 
heightened the attention devoted to public finances in the U.S.  In the short to medium run, the key 
relationships involve the nexus between the rising domestic and international financing costs of debt 
service, and the interactions with the current account deficit and net international debt position.  The 
international funding sources for U.S. government debt are of particular importance, and such funding has 
in recent years depended heavily on the behavior of foreign official holdings.  Analysis of prospects for 
financing the budget deficit is complicated because foreign official holdings, the foreign exchange value 
of the dollar, and the U.S. trade deficit and net international debt position are all intertwined.  In this 
paper, we assess the importance of foreign financial flows – and notably foreign official holdings of U.S. 
Treasury securities – not only for financing the U.S. trade and current account deficits but also for 
funding U.S. government borrowing and affecting U.S. long-term Treasury interest rates. 
 
This work adopts and extends the framework used by Kitchen (2007).  Using consensus projections for 
the U.S economy, net exports, and exchange rates, that analysis found that the outlook for the U.S. 
international debt position and net international income flows was generally less dire and more 
sustainable than had been typically assumed given the persistence of U.S. current account imbalances.  
With the drastic change in economic prospects in recent years, however, it is clear that a re-examination is 
in order. The financial crisis and the recession – and policy actions to mitigate both – have resulted in 
large increases in the U.S. Federal budget deficit and the publicly held debt, with an outlook for continued 
deficits and growing debt.  The deterioration in public finances has then brought an immediacy to the 
previously existing concerns regarding the sustainability of the nation’s public finances (Auerbach and 
Gale (2009)).  The situation is further complicated by the large share of U.S. Treasury debt held by 
foreigners. 
 
Within the setting of current and projected budget deficits and debt, this paper examines the role of 
foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities and the implications for Treasury security interest 
rates and relative international portfolio allocations.  The analysis presents empirical estimates of the 
impact of U.S. structural budget deficits and foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries on U.S. Treasury 
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security interest rates.  Using that information and baseline economic and budget projections, the 
implications of alternative assumptions about the projected behavior of foreign official holdings are 
examined for:  (1) the implied/required international portfolio adjustments for foreign holdings of U.S. 
international debt and other assets;  (2) the projected U.S. international net debt position and net income 
flows, including the role of U.S. government payments on foreign official holdings; (3) the effects of 
budget deficits, Federal Reserve security purchases, and foreign official holdings on U.S. Treasury 
interest rates;  (4) the potential feedback effects to and from interest rates to the U.S. budget deficit; and 
(5) a scenario with assumed higher growth in Federal Reserve holdings of Treasuries and partial 
monetization of the debt.  The issue of crowding out of international capital flows – under the assumption 
of a growing international portfolio share for foreign official holdings – is also raised.  Questions remain 
regarding the potential trade-offs the United States could face under these relationships and whether, 
under the current fiscal policy outlook, the high level of foreign official holdings implied by the interest 
rate projections of most current public and private economic forecasts could ever be considered 
reasonable or attainable.  The results therefore provide information regarding Meltzer’s (2009) claim that 
“There isn’t going to be enough money in the world in the years to come to finance the U.S. budget 
deficits.” 
 
The results and scenarios presented in this paper are not “forecasts” per se, but rather projections that 
illustrate some fundamental relationships for the U.S. fiscal outlook in an international setting, and 
specifically the role of international financial flows and portfolio adjustments.  The analysis is intended to 
provide a baseline case and alternative scenarios that are descriptive of the relationships involved, and to 
aid in better understanding those relationships and the implications for the U.S. fiscal outlook.  Further, 
the analysis doesn’t address issues or questions associated with varying views of short-run policy or 
cyclical behavior, but looks ahead to the relationships and pressures that would occur at an intermediate 
horizon beyond short-run transitions. 
 
Section 2 provides a brief review of some prior research and literature, providing background for the 
analysis of the paper.   Section 3 presents data and information on U.S. government debt and the base 
outlook consistent with projections by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  Section 4 examines an 
empirical specification and estimation results for U.S. Treasury interest rates and the role of budget 
deficits and foreign official holdings of Treasuries.  Section 5 presents the base case projections, 
including an explicit accounting for the large change in foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury 
securities (and other implied foreign portfolio allocations) required to meet the base case economic 
assumptions for interest rates.  The resulting outlook under the base case for the U.S. international debt 
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position, net international income flows, and U.S. government payments to foreign holders of Treasury 
securities is also presented.  Section 6 examines two alternative scenarios to the base case:  the first 
alternative considers how the projected outlook would change if foreign official holdings of Treasuries 
were fixed as a percent of U.S. GDP (a declining share of total Treasury securities outstanding); the 
second alternative presents the effects on the projections from assuming the Federal Reserve (Fed) 
implements a sustained increase in the rate of growth for its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities 
(including assumed pass-through to inflation, nominal interest rates, and the exchange value of the dollar 
from such a partial monetization of the debt).  Section 7 provides closing discussion. 
 
2.  SOME BACKGROUND AND SELECTED LITERATURE 
 
Questions about the sustainability of the U.S. current account and the outlook for U.S. international debt 
have received growing interest in recent years; the recent experience with and outlook for higher U.S. 
budget deficits and debt have raised further questions regarding the international implications.  The 
theoretical and empirical literature examining the relationships among budget deficits, international trade, 
current account sustainability, and the outlook for U.S. international debt and international net income 
flows is large.1  The traditional literature ascribes a fairly direct role between the budget balance and the 
current account balance.  Increases in government spending or reductions in taxes lead to increased 
aggregate demand, some of which spills over into increased imports.  Fiscal shocks of this nature then 
induce a positive correlation between budget deficits and current account deficits – with international 
financial flows helping to fund domestic investment, in contrast to a prior view that budget deficits would 
“crowd out” investment.  This “twin deficits” view dominated policy analysis during the 1980s, when tax 
rates were sharply reduced under the Reagan Administration and the exchange value of the dollar 
increased; empirical evidence appeared to buttress this view (Feldstein (1986)).2  The improvement in the 
trade balance as the budget deficit shrank also provided additional confirmation of the twin deficits view. 
 
This approach fell out of favor during the 1990s as public finances improved throughout the decade yet 
the current account deteriorated.  This episode highlighted the fact that alternative multiple shocks – 
either private demand, monetary, or supply side – can reverse the implied correlation.  Various 
explanations were forwarded.  The most prominent ones ascribe the enhanced growth prospects for the 
United States, as information and communication technologies raised productivity growth (e.g., Pakko 
                                                 
1 The theoretical literature linking budget deficits and trade balances, and stocks of government debt include the 
portfolio balance models of Kouri (1976) and Branson and Henderson (1985).  Recent treatments of the portfolio 
balance model have not explicitly modeled government, as opposed to private, assets. See for instance Blanchard, 
Giavazzi and Sa (2005). 
2 The “twin deficits” view is a straightforward application of the Mundell-Fleming model of the open economy. 
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(1999)).  In this intertemporal approach, in the presence of an upward revision in permanent income, 
running larger current account deficits would help smooth consumption.  Engel and Rogers (2009) have 
shown that the U.S. current account deficits throughout the 1990s and 2000s were consistent with 
expectations of future growth.  During the early- to mid-2000s, however, interest in the “twin deficits” 
hypothesis re-emerged as both budget and current account deficits widened (Chinn (2005)).   
 
In recent years questions concerning the “sustainability” of the U.S. current account deficit and the U.S. 
international debt position more generally have received much attention.  Mann (1999), Roubini and 
Setser (2004), Cline (2005), Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille (2005), Eichengreen (2006), and Kitchen 
(2007) are among those who have examined the challenging outlook for U.S. international trade and 
financial imbalances, and the varying views as to whether the outlook is sustainable or manageable.  In 
this paper, we focus on particular aspects of the relationship between budget deficits and the current 
account.  Specifically, we examine the role of changes in foreign official holdings – one part of the 
international financial asset portfolio – as a key international financial flow for funding U.S. budget 
deficits (given the outlook for the U.S. fiscal imbalance and growing debt), and against the backdrop of 
the outlook for continued U.S. international imbalances.  A related question that arises is the potential for 
“crowding out” to occur within the international portfolio flows if a greater share is devoted to U.S. 
Treasuries.  Several other researchers have conducted research on issues similar to those addressed here, 
notably Bergsten (2009), Cline (2009), and Mann (2009).  Mann (2009) and Bertaut, Kamin, and Thomas 
(2009) examine the world financial asset portfolio and the question of available international funding to 
meet prospective U.S. international imbalances; we discuss their findings in more detail further below.3  
The roles of alternative sources of funding for U.S. budget deficits – international and domestic – for the 
determination of U.S. interest rates are key issues in this analysis and are the focus of much of the 
subsequent discussion. 
 
                                                 
3 Ideally, one would want to use a portfolio balance model based on asset stocks to determine the impact of budget 
deficits on interest rates, exchange rates, and current account balances.  Unfortunately, the empirical literature on 
estimating these relationships is largely unsuccessful. 
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3.  U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT:  HISTORICAL DATA, TRENDS, AND THE BASE OUTLOOK 
 
This section provides background information and historical data on publicly-held U.S. government debt, 
including Treasury debt securities in particular, but also for U.S. agency and government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs).  Information is also provided on who holds the debt, including distinguishing between 
domestic and foreign owners, as well as private and official.  Assumptions used in the analysis regarding 
GSE debt holdings are addressed.  The base case outlook for the analysis – economic and budget 
projections from CBO’s baseline and long-run budget projections – is presented and discussed.  
 
3.1.  Treasury debt and foreign official holdings 
 
U.S. Treasury public debt is held by domestic and foreign holders, and private and official holders: 
 
(1) TTOT =  TD  +  TF 
 
  =  ( TD,P  +  TD,O )  +  ( TF,P  +  TF,O ) 
 
where TTOT is the total supply of Treasury debt held by the public, and for the other variables, the first 
subscript represents domestic (D) or foreign (F), and the second subscript is private (P) or official (O).4 
   
Historical data show growing U.S. Treasury debt held by the public (TTOT) and growing foreign official 
(TF,O) holdings and shares for U.S. Treasury securities outstanding – and especially for the recent period 
associated with and following the recession and financial crisis (see Chart 1).  Particularly noteworthy is 
the large and growing role for foreign official holdings, rising from just over $600 billion (17 percent of 
total Treasury debt securities outstanding) at the end of 1999 to about $3.2 trillion (35 percent of  total 
outstanding) by the end of 2010.  Domestic official (TD,O) amounts in (1) above are those held by the 
Federal Reserve, which over the past two-and-a-half decades, generally have accounted for about 10 to 15 
percent of total outstanding Treasuries (and also generally in the range of about 4 percent to 6 percent of 
GDP).  During the financial crisis, however, the Federal Reserve share fell sharply (to as low as 7 percent 
of Treasuries outstanding) as the Federal Reserve used its portfolio of Treasury securities as part of its 
implementation of the various lending facilities, and reflecting its portfolio shift (and expansion) to other 
assets (including government sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt securities).  More recently, the Federal 
Reserve’s share of Treasuries has increased back to around 10 percent of the total outstanding. 
                                                 
4 Treasury debt held by the public is the net debt and does not include the amounts owed within the U.S. government 
across accounts (e.g., social security and other trust fund accounts) that are included in measures of the “gross” debt. 
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3.2.  GSEs, Fannie and Freddie, and the Fed’s large-scale asset purchase program 
 
Following the decline in housing and mortgage markets and the ensuing financial crisis, much attention 
has been directed at U.S agency and GSE debt and securities – notably for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Mortgage Guarantee Corporation (Freddie Mac).  Chart 2 
shows historical data for agency, GSE, and GSE-backed securities by holder.5   During the financial 
crisis, the U.S. government undertook direct actions to provide backing for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
including direct purchases of GSE-backed debt.  As described in OMB’s Analytical Perspectives, 
Treasury acted to acquire GSE securities under temporary authority provided by the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008: 
 
Treasury initiated a temporary program to purchase MBS [mortgage-backed securities] 
issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which carry the GSEs’ standard guarantee 
against default. … Treasury purchased $226 billion in MBS from September 2008 to 
December 31, 2009, when the statutory authority for this program expired.  In addition, 
the Federal Reserve engaged in GSE MBS purchases over this period totaling $1 trillion 
through the end of 2009.  (OMB (2010), p. 350)   
 
The Federal Reserve’s purchases and holdings of agency and GSE-backed securities – through its balance 
sheet expansion and purchase of mortgage-backed securities – has attracted much attention because of the 
more-than-doubling of the Fed's balance sheet (and, hence, the monetary base) since the end of 2007, with 
much of that increase held in GSE-backed debt securities.  In early 2009 the Federal Reserve 
implemented a plan to expand credit and support aggregate demand through purchases of longer-term 
assets – described by Kohn (2009) as the large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) program.  The Fed increased 
purchases of GSE and agency debt, mortgage-backed securities, and longer-term U.S. Treasury securities.  
FOMC statements announced that the program would include purchases of up to $200 billion of agency 
debt, up to $300 billion in longer-term U.S. Treasury securities, and up to $1.25 trillion in agency 
mortgage-backed securities. 6  In November 2010, the FOMC announced plans “to purchase a further 
$600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011.”  
                                                 
5 Beyond Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the total amounts in Chart 2 include the Federal Home Loan Banks and 
other agencies. 
6 At the end of 2010, agency and GSE-backed securities accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total assets on the 
Federal Reserve balance sheet, and Treasury securities accounted for about 40 percent, up from about 30 percent at 
the end of 2009. (See the H.4.1 release of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.) 
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The data show the U.S. government role – although substantial in absolute dollar amounts and as a share 
of the Fed’s balance sheet – has been a relatively small share of the total agency and GSE debt (Chart 2).  
Also, the portfolio changes have been effectively, on net, primarily domestic in nature with private 
domestic holdings declining with the increase in Treasury and Fed holdings.  How the Federal Reserve 
and Treasury unwind their GSE positions will be an important policy issue going forward – especially for 
monetary policy interactions.  Nonetheless, the large increase in borrowing for housing that fueled the 
prior excessive increase in the overall level of GSE debt securities is a thing of the past. 
 
For the analysis of this paper, specific assumptions are made for the projections (described further below) 
regarding Federal Reserve holdings of longer-term Treasuries and GSE securities and Federal budget 
exposure – that the expansion will be gradually unwound in an orderly and benign fashion over a five 
year period.  These assumptions are similar to those made by Chung et al (2011) and described by Yellen 
(2011).  As such, the analysis for the base case presented below has an implicit assumption that Federal 
Reserve policy will gradually and successfully unwind its expanded portfolio holdings of GSE securities 
and longer-term Treasuries and return to its pre-crisis position of a balance sheet comprised primarily of 
Treasury securities, and at a level consistent with the sustained growth and low inflation of the economic 
projections.  Analogously, foreign portfolio holdings of GSE and agency securities are assumed in the 
base projection to be consistent with that gradual unwinding and trend economic projections.  Hence, the 
analysis reflects general funding and portfolio pressures and not specific pressures associated with 
speculative scenarios regarding the Fed balance sheet or GSE securities.7  Regarding the Federal budget 
exposure, the CBO’s previous treatment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as government entities in its 
budget accounting and estimates explicitly includes the net expected Federal budget exposure by 
including “a subsidy equal to the shortfall between the current value of the mortgages and the liabilities 
used to fund them” (CBO (2010(b)).  CBO estimates in 2009 included the implicit subsidy cost of the 
existing business as well as new business.  The analysis presented here proceeds using the CBO 
projections, albeit a fuller accounting of the implied exposure to Fannie and Freddie could potentially 
suggest an expected debt effect of perhaps an additional couple hundred billion dollars. 
 
3.3.  The base case and CBO projections 
 
The base case of this paper is based on CBO’s baseline economic assumptions (CBO (2011)).  The CBO 
economic projections assume the U.S. economy continues to rebound from the recession and returns over 
                                                 
7 This approach is consistent with CBO baseline assumptions (CBO (2011)) and the information presented in 
various statements and minutes of the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (e.g., Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors (2010)). 
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several years to its potential growth path.  Output and unemployment gaps are expected to steadily 
decline and interest rates and inflation rates are assumed to reflect the return to an environment of 
sustained real growth at potential with low inflation.  The budget projections used in this analysis reflect 
CBO’s baseline budget outlook adjusted to an alternative scenario that includes policies that would likely 
be adopted absent fundamental policy change.  Although various alternative policy and budget outlooks 
are possible, the use of the CBO’s projections under the alternative scenario provides a benchmark that 
generally incorporates policies that should be included in a true baseline policy outlook, including key tax 
provisions that are set to expire but that have had broad political support for extension.8 
 
Regarding the international economic outlook, both the Administration and the CBO – based on language 
in recent outlook discussions – implicitly have an improving net export outlook in their economic 
assumptions.  For example, for the Administration: 
 
As the U.S. economy recovers from the current crisis, it is unlikely to return to current 
account deficits as large as those in the mid-2000s. ... The specific path of the current  
account as the economy exits the crisis will depend on whether government and private 
saving rise ahead of, or along with, a rebound in private investment. But in the long run, 
the current account deficit is likely to be smaller than it was before the crisis. ... Given 
that the current account deficit has already narrowed to roughly 3 percent of GDP—less 
than half its peak—the crucial challenge will be to avoid a reversion to a high-spending, 
low-saving economy.  A successful shift toward a more balanced world growth model 
generated by increased consumption in nations with current account surpluses could 
improve net exports even more.  This could bring the current account deficit toward its 
mid-1990s level of roughly 1 to 2 percent of U.S. GDP. (Council of Economic Advisers 
(2010), pp. 132-133) 
 
For the CBO, in addition to the outlook for improving U.S. trade balance, the outlook for a continued 
long-term downward trend for the value of the dollar is also described: 
 
                                                 
8 In a 2010 report, CBO acknowledged some of the issues addressed in this paper:  “In fact, CBO’s projections 
understate the severity of the long-term budget problem because they do not incorporate the significant negative 
effects that accumulating substantial amounts of additional federal debt would have on the economy:  Large budget 
deficits would reduce national saving, leading to higher interest rates, more borrowing from abroad, and less 
domestic investment—which in turn would lower income growth in the United States.”  (CBO 2010(e), p. xi)  CBO 
(2010(f)) also provided discussion of the risk of fiscal crisis from higher Federal debt. 
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... CBO expects that the dollar will continue to decline in the long run as part of an 
adjustment toward sustainable borrowing from foreigners. (Congressional Budget Office, 
2011(a), p. 41) 
 
Similarly, the average for the private Blue Chip forecasters' projections (Blue Chip Economic Indicators 
(2011)) of real net exports shows a slight downward trend over the 2012-2016 period with further small 
decline into the 2017-2021 period.  Such a projection would indicate a steady projected improvement in 
the U.S. trade balance as a percentage of GDP.  Hence, to reflect the general "consensus" among public 
and private forecasters, the base case projection includes a gradual trend improvement in U.S. net exports.  
 
The outlooks for U.S. government debt, interest rates, net exports, and other economic variables are all 
intertwined and the interactions are not always fully understood and accounted for.  Public and private 
forecasts generally do not have explicit information on assumptions about international holdings of U.S. 
Treasury securities, U.S. net international debt or net international income flows, or the portfolio 
allocations for international debt.  The analysis of this paper helps to illustrate the importance of 
recognizing and accounting for those relationships and effects. 
 
4.  U.S. GOVERNMENT DEFICITS, FOREIGN OFFICIAL RESERVES AND INTEREST RATES 
 
It is commonplace to attribute effects of budget deficits and international financial flows on interest rates. 
Interestingly, however, the recent literature regarding the nature and magnitude of the combined effects in 
the era of large deficits and large flows is not particularly extensive, nor definitive.  This section presents 
an empirical specification and results for estimating the role of budget deficits and changes in foreign 
official holdings of Treasury securities, as well as changes in Fed holdings, in the determination of U.S. 
Treasury interest rates.  The estimated relationships are then used to analyze what the base case 
projections implicitly require for foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries. 
 
The estimated relationships presented here essentially describe how long-term Treasury rates adjust to 
induce private holdings of Treasuries – given the outlook for budget deficits and the behavior of official 
domestic and foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries.  The specification is also based on the assumption that 
the Federal Reserve implements monetary policy through open market operations on Treasury securities 
in order to set the short-term interest rate.  In line with the extant literature, we assume the Fed sets the 
target rate by policy rule as a function of the output and inflation gaps, as described by Taylor (1993). 
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4.1.  Empirical specification for U.S. Treasury rates 
 
The approach taken here draws from various studies in a growing literature.  Gale and Orszag (2002, 
2005) surveyed the literature on budget deficits and interest rates, primarily in a closed economy setting, 
and highlighted the significant role of Federal debt and budget deficits in determining long-term interest 
rates.  Kitchen (2003) presented a framework based on short-term interest rates being determined by a 
Taylor rule and with the structural Federal budget deficit determining the term spread for long-term 
Treasury interest rates relative to short-term rates.  Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002) also observed a 
significant role for the Federal budget deficit for the long- to short-term spread for Treasury interest rates. 
The advent of the “conundrum” – that is, surprisingly low long-term interest rates relative to short rates – 
inspired research introducing an international dimension.  Warnock and Warnock (2006) and Chinn and 
Frankel (2007) augmented conventional bond pricing specifications with international variables, namely 
foreign official purchases of U.S. Treasuries.  More recently, Laubach (2009) examined the response of 
long-horizon forward rates to increases in the projected deficit- and debt-to-GDP ratios. 
 
The specification employed here is based on that presented in Kitchen (2003), augmented to include the 
role of foreign official reserves as highlighted in Warnock and Warnock (2006) and Chinn and 
Frankel(2007).  Kitchen (2003) derived an equation of the following quasi-reduced form for the term 
structure spread between the long- and short-term Treasury interest rates:  
 
tttttjtkt yyii   )()()2( ,,  
 
where it,j is the nominal interest rate on a j-period Treasury security in period t, πt  is the inflation rate, yt 
is a (log) measure of aggregate output, and the “bar” variables represent the target or full employment 
levels of the corresponding variables.  The term premium σt is assumed to be comprised of (1) a liquidity 
premium and (2) a risk premium associated with uncertainty about interest rates generally, as well as 
uncertainty about the structural Federal budget deficit, specifically.  For the purposes of this paper, the 
roles of foreign official holdings of Treasury securities and Federal Reserve balances of longer-term 
securities, are also included in affecting the term premium, affecting the relative demand-supply 
relationship over time, and thereby the market price and yield for Treasury securities.  The working 
assumption underlying equation (2) is that short-term interest rates are determined by the monetary policy 
rule; external changes in relative supply and demand for longer-term Treasury securities would therefore 
show up across the term structure beyond the short-term interest rate.  We focus on the yield for 10-year 
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Treasury securities, but observed effects occur in shorter-term regions of the term structure as well.9  The 
role of increased Fed holdings of longer-term Treasuries and mortgage backed securities as part of the 
large scale asset purchases (LSAP) program and the subsequent additional purchases of Treasuries (QE1 
and QE2 colloquially) is also included in the estimation.10   
 
The empirical specifications used in regression analysis are based on: 
 
(3)  SPREADt  =  β0  +  β1 UNGAPt  +  β2 INFLt  +  β3 STRSURPt  +  β4 FOROFFICIALt  +  β5 FEDLT +  et 
 
where SPREAD is the term spread for longer-term Treasury yields relative to short-term Treasury rates 
(the 10-year yield minus the 3-month Treasury bill rate); UNGAP is the deviation of the unemployment 
rate from the natural rate (as estimated by the CBO)11; INFL is the difference between the inflation rate 
(the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditure price index of the NIPAs) and targeted 
inflation (here assumed at 1.8 percent)12; STRSURP is the structural, or cyclically-adjusted budget 
surplus/deficit as a percent of potential GDP (as estimated by the CBO); FOROFFICIAL is the change in 
foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as a percent of potential GDP; and FEDLT is the 
change in Fed holdings of long-term (more than 5 years) Treasuries, U.S. government agency, and 
mortgage-backed securities as a percent of potential GDP. 
 
Chart 3 shows foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as a share of total outstanding 
Treasury securities; Chart 4 shows foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as a percent of 
U.S. potential GDP.  Both charts show the rising importance of foreign official holdings.  The variable 
used in the empirical analysis – the change in foreign official holdings of Treasuries expressed as a 
percent of potential GDP – is similar to that used in Warnock and Warnock (2006).13
                                                 
9 The estimation used is an approach that implicitly includes the well-known relationship of the term spread as a 
signal of economic activity across the business cycle – including for recession probability estimation (e.g., Stock and 
Watson (2003), Wright (2006)) – in combination with key factors that affect the risk and relative supply and demand 
for longer-term Treasury securities beyond real activity and inflation.  The structural budget deficit is a supply 
shifter for longer-term Treasuries; Fed and foreign official holdings a demand shifter.  The relationships presented 
thus also provide information for why the term spread isn't always a clear predictor for future economic activity. 
10 Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010) found the LSAP reduced U.S. long yields during  implementation.  
See also, Hamilton and Wu (2010) for additional estimates. 
11 The unemployment gap and the output gap are roughly interchangeable measures (a là Okun's law) of the relative 
cyclical position of the economy, the relative slack that exists in the economy. 
12 The rate of inflation measured by the PCE price index tends to be several tenths of a percentage point lower than 
for the CPI; the 1.8 percent target rate used here is roughly equivalent to a CPI rate of about 2 percent or just over. 
13 This specification for the variables follows the structural budget deficit being expressed as a percent of potential 
GDP.  Foreign official holdings of Treasuries data are from the Flow of Funds; the historical structural budget 
deficit is from CBO.  Warnock and Warnock (2006) used a specially constructed variable for foreign official flows. 
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The coefficient on the UNGAP variable, β1, is expected to be positive, and the coefficient on the 
INFLDEV variable, β2, is expected to be negative, reflecting their roles in the monetary policy rule and 
the resulting relationship to short-term rates.14  That is, consistent with the Taylor rule and with well-
anchored long-run expected inflation, as output rises relative to potential, and unemployment falls relative 
to the NAIRU, the Federal Reserve would raise the short-term interest rate relative to the long-term 
interest rate (ceteris paribus) and the term spread would decline.  Similarly, as inflation increased relative 
to the target level of inflation, the Federal Reserve would raise the short-term interest rate relative to the 
long-term rate and the term spread would decline.  The coefficient on the structural surplus variable, β3, is 
hypothesized to be negative; an increase in the structural budget surplus (a fall in the deficit) would 
reduce the relative supply of Treasury securities and reduce risk and uncertainty for longer-term Treasury 
securities, leading to a lower long-term yield relative to short-term (short-run-policy-determined) rates.  
The coefficients on the change in foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries, and for Federal Reserve 
holdings of long-term Treasuries, MBS and U.S. agency assets, are posited to be negative; an increase in 
official holdings (foreign or domestic) is effectively an exogenous demand shift (at that point in time) that 
would lower longer-term yields. 
 
4.2.  Estimation results 
 
Estimation of specifications from equation (3) above were conducted using annualized data, reflecting the 
fact that key variables for the broader analysis of the paper – budget projections and the international 
asset position – are only available at that frequency.15  The regression results are reported in Table 1; they 
confirm the hypothesized relationships included in equations (2) and (3) above.  The results in Table 1 
build to the full specification.  Line 1 shows the results using the variables affecting short-term policy 
(UNGAP and INFL) and the structural budget surplus as a percent of potential GDP (STRSURP).   Note 
that while a large proportion of the variation in the spread is explained by the specification reported in 
line 1, the serial correlation indicated by the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests that important factors are 
omitted.  This buttresses the economic motivation for examining an expanded version of the basic 
domestic specification.  
                                                 
14 Note that the specification doesn't "require" and is not based on any specific values for policy coefficients on the 
gap and inflation variables, only that the policy rule in practice would adjust short-term rates in accordance with the 
expected direction. 
15 Estimations were also performed on a quarterly basis and observed results were generally consistent with those 
using annual data.  We use fiscal-year-consistent data. 
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Line 2 includes the variable for the change in foreign official holdings of Treasuries as a percent of 
potential GDP (FOROFFICIAL), and line 3 includes changes in Federal Reserve holdings of long-term 
government assets (FEDLT).  The results in lines 2 and 3 generally conform to the hypothesized 
relationships for the specification, reflecting the policy relationships underlying the determination of 
short-term rates and confirming the importance of the structural budget deficit and the change in foreign 
and domestic official holdings as determinants of the long- to short-term Treasury yield spread.  The 
results in line 3 show a significant negative coefficient for the FEDLT variable, conforming to the view 
that the Fed’s purchases of longer-term Treasury and agency securities as part of the LSAP program 
lowered long-term yields and relative to short-term rates.  The coefficient on FOROFFICIAL is not 
statistically significant in line 3; a high degree of multicollinearity between STRSURP, FOROFFICIAL, 
and FEDLT variables is likely the cause, with correlations in the 0.54 to 0.75 range.  Since it is reasonable 
to expect that exogenous relative supply and demand effects in the Treasury market have identical effects 
on interest rates, we chose to impose and test the restriction of equal coefficients on STRSURP, 
FOROFFICIAL, and FEDLT.  The estimates of the resulting specification are reported in line 4 of Table 
1.  Our conjecture is borne out by the results; an F test for testing the restriction of equality of the 
coefficients shows that equality cannot be rejected. 
   
The results in the estimated equation of line 4 generally conform to prior estimates in the literature for the 
effects of the budget deficit on long-term Treasury yields – and for the effect of the change in foreign 
official holdings, as well.  The estimated effect is 35 basis points on the 10-year yield relative to the short-
term yield for each one percentage point of GDP for the structural budget deficit – a result that lines up 
with the estimates from Gale and Orszag (2002, 2005) at 25 to 35 basis points and Laubach (2009) at 20 
to 30 basis points.  Also, as observed in Warnock and Warnock (2006) and in Chinn and Frankel (2007), 
the results confirm the importance of foreign official holdings of Treasuries as a determinant of the long-
term Treasury yield (here expressed relative to the short-term yield).  Warnock and Warnock, for 
example, showed estimated effects for the budget deficit (relative to GDP) of 19 to 31 basis points and for 
foreign official flows (measured relative to GDP) of 24 to 61 basis points; Chinn and Frankel (2007) 
observe estimates in the range of 52 to 71 basis points (for real and nominal Treasury rates, and for a 
sample extending to September 2004).16  For the FEDLT variable – the change in Fed holdings of 
Treasury, MBS and U.S. government agency securities with more than 5 years to maturity as a percent of 
potential GDP – the constrained coefficient estimate is also roughly consistent (albeit somewhat higher) 
with other estimates from the literature for the effects of the Fed’s purchases of longer-term assets.  The 
                                                 
16 Because of estimation and specification differences, the coefficient estimates are not all directly comparable, but 
nonetheless give references for relative magnitudes. 
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FEDLT variable in our estimation had a value of about 2.8 percentage points of GDP for 2009, so the 
coefficient value of -0.35 indicates an estimated impact on the term premium of just under 100 basis 
points for that year.  This estimate is somewhat larger than that obtained by Gagnon, et al. (2009), who 
estimated that the effect of the first-round LSAP was in the range of 38 to 82 basis points (although 
standard errors of the coefficient estimates indicate a degree of imprecision that allows for overlapping 
confidence intervals at typical levels).17 
  
The summary regression statistics for the line 4 equation are also generally good, with an adjusted R-
squared of 0.685, a Durbin-Watson of 1.91, and a standard error of the regression of just under 0.7 
percentage point.  Throughout the Table 1 results, the declining Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
values verify the use of the additional variables in each line and the restriction imposed in line 4.  Testing 
for heteroskedasticity produced test statistics that did not reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
for the line 4 equation.  To examine an additional issue and relationship of recent years, lines 5 and 6 of 
Table 1 add a variable to examine Taylor’s (2009) observation that the Fed’s policy for interest rates 
during early years of the 2000s resulted in interest rates well below the levels indicated by the Taylor rule.  
Given that the specification employed is derived using the assumption of short-term rates being 
determined by a Taylor rule, the DISCMPOL variable (for “discretionary monetary policy” and taking on 
a value of 1 for 2002-2004 and zero otherwise) was used to capture the effects in the estimation that 
result from the deviation from Fed policy from the Taylor rule over that time.  The results in lines 5 and 6 
show a significant positive coefficient for the DISCMPOL variable, conforming to the view that 
discretionary monetary policy kept short-term yields abnormally low for the given relative gap and 
inflation relationships of that period.  The estimated coefficient shows the term spread was higher by 
nearly 1 percentage point, suggesting an equivalent negative effect on the short-term rate, a result that 
matches up with Taylor’s (2009) observation about the Federal Reserve’s use of discretionary policy 
during that time period.  The other coefficient estimates of the equation are robust and change little and 
the AIC statistics for equations 5 and 6 are lower than for equations 3 and 4, indicating significant added 
explanatory information from including the discretionary monetary policy term.  Chart 5 shows the actual 
10-year to 3-month Treasury spread compared to fitted values from the full specification of line 6. 
 
The results presented here confirm an analytical approach in which short-term rates are generally 
determined according to a Taylor rule, with budget deficits, foreign official holdings of Treasury 
securities, and Federal Reserve purchases of longer-term assets affecting long-term yields relative to 
short-term rates.  The evidence also provides information for the debate of Taylor (2009) and Greenspan 
                                                 
17 See, also, Hamilton and Wu (2010) for more discussion and comparisons of estimated effects of the LSAP. 
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(2009, 2010) regarding the roles of domestic policy and international financial flows in contributing to the 
economic environment associated with and leading to the financial crisis. The results are consistent with 
specific aspects of the views of both Taylor – that U.S. short-term rates were kept abnormally low for 
several years – and Greenspan – that international flows from abroad (especially foreign official) kept 
long-term rates low.  The results therefore also point to an interpretation that policy errors – both 
domestic and international – contributed to the financial imbalances of recent years.  Notably, foreign 
official flows from abroad kept long-term rates lower than otherwise, contributing to an environment in 
which financial flows and interest rates exacerbated the housing and financial boom and bust.18 
 
 
5. IS THERE ENOUGH MONEY IN THE WORLD?  BASE PROJECTIONS AND IMPLIED INTERNATIONAL 
PORTFOLIO ADJUSTMENTS 
 
In this section, we examine the outlook for international debt and net income flows using historical rates 
of return and assumptions regarding portfolio allocations, in a manner consistent with relationships 
regarding the trajectory of rates of return and debt as modeled in Kitchen (2007).19  The exercise does not 
produce a forecast per se, but rather a projection (with specific details) consistent with economic and 
budget projections.  Our base case uses economic, deficit and debt projections over the next 10 years 
based on CBO projections.  We project foreign holdings and the U.S. international investment position 
through 2020, starting from historical investment position data through 2009 (BEA (2010)).20 
 
5.1.  Interest rates and other assumptions in the base case outlook 
 
In constructing the base case (and to illustrate the implied role for foreign official holdings), the various 
components and assumptions were derived in a manner to be consistent with the CBO projections.  
CBO’s economic assumptions have the output-unemployment gaps closing to zero over several years and 
inflation settles at a targeted level (around 2 percent depending on the inflation measure used).  Budget 
projections consistent with an “alternative” budget outlook have the structural budget deficit initially 
falling from recent highs but then gradually rising relative to GDP through the end of the 10-year 
projection; by 2020 the structural budget deficit of the CBO alternative is over 6 percent of GDP.  Those 
                                                 
18 These observations are similar to those of Greenspan (2009) regarding foreign financial flows and of Bernanke 
(2005) regarding a global saving glut, with the observed relationship here pointing to the (foreign) policy-
determined flows via foreign official holdings.  Warnock and Warnock (2006) also discuss this observation.  
Bergsten (2009) stated:  “… the crisis occurred at least partly because the rest of the world was too willing to 
finance US current account deficits rather than becoming unwilling to do so.” 
19 Kitchen (2007) provides a description of the model used; the model has been maintained and updated to 
incorporate new data and minor methodological changes. 
20 Cline (2005, 2009) also addresses the implications of the U.S. fiscal outlook for the U.S. international debt 
position and international income flows, but without a full explicit accounting for the specific international and 
domestic sources for financing U.S. Treasury debt and the implications thereof. 
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budget assumptions yield the outlook in the CBO projections for the debt held by the public, which under 
the alternative scenario including likely policies, rises to over 90 percent of GDP by 2020.  In the base 
case of this analysis, foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities are determined – based on the 
empirical estimates above – so as to roughly reproduce the long-term interest rate assumptions of the base 
economic assumptions.  CBO’s projections of long-term Treasury yield projections are similar to those of 
the Administration and the Blue Chip consensus forecast, so the results are not being driven by special 
characteristics of the CBO outlook.21 
 
Table 2 shows the results for the projections for interest rates for the years 2013-2020.  Generally, similar 
results are observed for the Taylor rule-generated short-term rates compared to the public and private 
projections, with the estimates in the 3.9 to 4.3 percent range for 2017-2020, for example.22  Using the 
estimated relationships from the equation of line 3 in Table 1 and the base case budget assumptions for 
the structural budget deficit, the estimated term spread in the final line of Table 2 is produced by  
 
 Table 2  
                                                 
21 Note Cline (2009) observes that “the CBO long-term projection itself does not appear to increase the interest rate 
in response to the higher deficit.” CBO(2010(e)) accounts for that effect in separate discussion.  Here, the derivation 
allows foreign official flows to provide the financing that keeps rates at the levels of the CBO assumptions.  
22 The Taylor rule specification employed is based on the form identified in Taylor (1993), with a coefficient on the 
unemployment gap of 1.0 (two times the 0.5 for the output gap via Okun’s law) and a coefficient on the inflation gap 
of 0.5; we use an equilibrium short-term real rate of 2.1 percent and a target CPI inflation rate of 2 percent. 
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assuming the needed increase in foreign official holdings (and also for the given assumed unwinding of 
the Fed’s portfolio) to approximately replicate the 10-year yield levels of the CBO and other projections.  
The increase in foreign official holdings required to produce the base case interest rates (given the rising 
structural budget deficit and Fed unwinding) is addressed further in the following discussion. 
 
5.2.  Portfolio allocations – historical data and base projections 
 
Table 3 shows the international portfolio allocations for U.S.-owned assets abroad and foreign-owned 
assets in the United States for selected years for a historical period and our assumptions for the base 
projection.  The portfolio shares used in the projections should be viewed as being representative of the 
changes that would have to occur in order to conform to the changes in foreign official holdings assumed 
or required to occur by case.  A fully-specified portfolio allocation model for international assets could 
potentially be a useful enrichment of the analysis provided here, but is beyond the scope of the present 
analysis and is an area for further research.23  In particular, a better understanding of the potential relative 
asset effects for "crowding out" in the international portfolio could be gained.24 
 
Of particular importance in the projections is the path of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries relative to 
U.S. GDP that is required to be consistent with the interest rate projections of the base case economics – 
and the resulting portfolio shares of U.S. treasuries for foreign holdings of U.S. assets.  The derived large 
increase in the portfolio share for foreign official holdings of Treasuries (last line of Table 3) – rising 
from 24 percent to nearly 49 percent – reveals the extent to which the projections for long-term Treasury 
interest rates remaining below 5½ percent (as in private and public projections), in the face of a rising 
Federal structural budget deficit, depend on a continued large increase in foreign holdings of Treasuries.25   
 
The portfolio shares of the base projection also show the potential “crowding out” that would occur in the 
portfolio allocations for international financial assets.  Historically, the concept of crowding out 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Black and Litterman (1992) and He and Litterman (1999). 
24 Mann (2009, p. 48) discusses the challenges regarding understanding the determination of the portfolio allocations 
for foreign held assets:  “All told, from the standpoint of sustainability research relevant for projections, this body of 
analysis points out the challenges of projecting both the level and any change in the desire of foreigners to continue 
to buy US assets and the type of assets.” 
25 Note that the required increase in foreign holdings of Treasuries is directly dependent on the magnitude of the 
coefficient on foreign holdings as estimated and reported in Table 1.  If we were to use a larger estimated effect 
(such as observed by Chinn and Frankel (2007) or at the upper end of the Warnock and Warnock (2006), the 
required increase in foreign holdings for the base case would be accordingly smaller, and on a roughly proportional 
basis.  For example, an estimated coefficient at around -0.55 instead of the constrained -0.34 we used would require 
an increase in foreign holdings only about three-fifths as large as we have in the base case; yet the general result 
would still hold. 
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2001 2005 2009 2010 2011 2016 2020
US Owned Assets Abroad:
  Direct Investment 26.8 24.6 27.2 26.2 25.2 23.7 23.1
  Foreign Securities 34.4 40.2 36.8 38.2 38.9 40.1 40.1
    Bonds 8.8 9.4 10.0 10.4 10.2 10.3 10.3
    Corporate Stocks 25.6 30.8 26.8 27.9 28.8 29.8 29.8
  US claims, Nonbanks 13.3 9.5 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.5 6.7
  US claims, Banks 22.0 23.3 27.3 27.2 27.1 26.9 26.9
  Official 2.1 1.7 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.9
  Other US Govt 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Foreign Owned Assets in the US:
  Direct Investment 18.6 14.9 15.1 14.9 14.7 13.5 12.9
  US Treasury Securities 4.6 5.0 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.2
  US Securities other than Treas 34.5 34.1 29.8 30.1 26.4 18.3 15.5
    Corporate and other bonds 16.4 17.6 16.0 16.1 14.3 10.3 8.8
    Corporate stocks 18.1 16.5 13.8 13.9 12.1 8.0 6.6
  US currency 2.8 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4
  US liabilities, nonbanks 9.8 5.2 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.3
  US liabilities, banks 16.2 20.4 20.3 20.4 18.6 14.5 13.1
  Official 13.6 18.1 24.7 24.3 30.0 43.4 48.6
Source:  Historical data, Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors' projections
Projections/Assumptions
International Investment Asset Shares, Percent of Total
associated with budget deficits typically referred to the prospect of domestic investment being crowded 
out because of higher interest rates.  However, beginning with the large budget deficits of the mid-1980s, 
net exports were more likely to be crowded out.  Hence, the United States was able to continue to 
maintain private domestic investment and even continued positive net international investment income 
flows, even as the U.S. net international debt increased.  In the base case presented here, however, the 
implied portfolio shares reveal the pressures that will occur with the persistent need to fund U.S. budget 
deficits – increasing shares of assets held in U.S. Treasury securities, and decreasing shares held in direct 
foreign investment, corporate stocks and bonds, and in other assets.  Reduced foreign flows and holdings 
in private assets reveal the potential manifestation of crowding out in the foreign asset portfolio. 
 
 
Table 3 
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5.3.  The international debt and income outlook under the base case – and other issues 
 
The overall U.S. net international debt position and the associated net international income flows derived 
under the base case are shown in Charts 6 and 7.   Under the base case, U.S. net international debt as a 
share of GDP roughly doubles over the 10-year projection period, increasing from about 20 percent of 
GDP to 44 percent.  Net international income flows turn negative and steadily decline, from roughly +1 
percent of GDP in recent years to about -2½ percent of GDP by the end of the ten-year projection.  That 
negative net international income flow represents a growing wedge between GDP and national income.  
Note that, even with the assumption in the base case of a gradually improving U.S. net trade position over 
the projection, the current account deficit would gradually widen, reflecting the increasingly negative net 
international income flows.  
 
The increased foreign holdings of Treasury securities under the base case result in a substantial increase 
in interest payments to foreigners on Treasury debt as part of the net international income flow (see 
Charts 8 and 9).  Chart 9 shows that interest payments for Treasuries relative to GDP account for the bulk 
of the change in net international flows over the ten-year projection (shown in Chart 7), accounting for an 
increase of over 3 percent of GDP.  Charts 8 and 9 also highlight the interesting result that, initially, the 
payments to foreign holders of Treasuries are relatively low for several years – despite rising foreign 
holdings – as interest rates on Treasuries are projected to be abnormally low during the recession and 
early recovery period.  However, as interest rates rise to higher levels, interest payments to foreign 
holders of Treasuries rise sharply, in absolute terms, and relative to GDP.26  Chart 8 also shows that the 
increase in foreign holdings of Treasuries under the base case over the 2010-2020 projection – that is, the 
increase required to keep Treasury bond yields from rising higher than shown in the base economic 
assumptions (given the structural budget deficit projection) – amounts to the bulk of the $13 trillion 
increase in the base-case projection for publicly-held Treasury debt. 
                                                 
26 These increases essentially show the combined effect from having the growing share of Treasuries in the foreign-
held asset portfolio (the share rising from 24 percent to nearly 49 percent) and the increasing effective rate of return 
on those assets from just over 2 percent to around 5 percent. 
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5.4.  Further and fundamental challenges of the base case 
 
The base case economic projection above is generally consistent with private and public economic 
forecasts, and in particular regarding U.S. nominal GDP growth, interest rates and net export outlook.  As 
such, the projection includes:  GDP rebounding out of the recession and gradually returning to potential; 
an improving trade balance (with associated gradual decline in the dollar over time); and relatively benign 
longer-term interest rate levels. 27  Those results are assumed to occur with and despite rising structural 
budget deficits.28  In the following, we consider potential challenges from some alternative relationships. 
 
5.4.1.  Foreign official holdings and currency values?  One challenge concerns the relationships 
involved with foreign official holdings, currency values, and the net export outlook.  From the perspective 
of the balance of payments, and the recognition of the role of increasing foreign official assets in keeping 
exchange values of currencies low, a fundamental question emerges regarding whether such a large 
increase in foreign official assets – required to keep U.S. long-term interest rates relatively low – could 
also be associated with the improving net export deficit assumed by public and private forecasters and 
used in the base case.  The projections of the base case were derived implicitly and explicitly accounting 
for the effects on international flows and stocks accompanying the assumptions.  Hence, the required 
matching of trade and financial flows occurs.  But the combined set of assumptions is fundamentally 
different from what has occurred historically, with foreign official holdings accommodating currency 
valuations – and in a manner that mirrored the U.S. net export deficit (Chart 10).  The question then exists 
whether the joint set of assumptions properly accounts for the trade-offs for foreign official holdings, 
managed currency valuations, and trade.  High foreign official holdings of Treasuries could keep Treasury 
yields low, but also would tend to be associated with relatively higher demand for the dollar and keeping 
the exchange value of foreign currencies low relative to the dollar.  That, in turn, would tend to promote 
continued U.S. trade imbalances – a result contrary to the underlying assumptions of the base case.  
 
5.4.2.  Negative impacts on GDP from international portfolio crowding out?  A second challenge 
regards whether the real GDP growth assumptions fully account for the adverse impacts on investment 
associated with the distorted financial flows and portfolio allocations of the base case.  With the extent of 
crowding out of private flows to private allocations in the international accounts in order to accommodate 
holdings of Treasury securities (see Table 3) – potential crowding out of investments in corporate equity 
                                                 
27 That is, benign from a historical comparison basis for the economy in a sustained expansion with relatively low 
inflation. 
28 Note that CBO (2010(c)) – in its description of the potential economic effects from the President’s budget – 
considered some aspects of the open vs. closed economy relationships and the role of international flows.  Much of 
that focus was on the behavior of private flows – a different perspective than the role of foreign official holdings. 
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and bonds, banking assets, and even foreign direct investment – does the real GDP growth and underlying 
investment assumed in the base case fully account for that?29  One way to avoid such crowding out would 
be for an overall higher flow of international financing – for trade and current account deficits to widen 
(as in the first challenge above) – but such an outcome is inconsistent with the assumptions of the base 
case, and would further perpetuate international imbalances that most observers view as unsustainable.   
 
5.4.3.  Is there enough money in the world … in the “global portfolio?”  A third challenge is whether 
the increase in foreign holdings of such magnitude as in the base case is plausible or even possible.  That 
is, reflecting the Meltzer quote earlier in the paper:  "Is there enough money in the world?"  Chart 11 
shows the implied effect from the base case on foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as a 
percent of world GDP (in U.S. dollars).  The large increase in foreign official holdings implied by the 
base case would require those holdings to rise to over 20 percent of rest-of-world (ROW) GDP, up from 
less than 5 percent for most years of history.  Bertaut, Kamin and Thomas (2009) and Mann (2009) 
examine the issue of the U.S. asset share of the total world asset portfolio and the extent to which foreign 
investment in U.S. assets can increase under continued U.S. current account deficits and growth in the 
U.S. net international debt.  Mann observed a “financial leverage” for the “global investor portfolio” of 
1.6 times (160 percent) ROW GDP.  The implied increase in foreign official holdings to 20 percent of 
ROW GDP by 2020 could at first glance therefore seem to represent a potentially manageable shift 
compared to the total (non-U.S.) world portfolio.  Mann showed that the share of U.S. assets held by 
foreigners in the world portfolio was about 14 percent in 2006, and that even with a doubling or tripling 
of that share (associated with projected U.S. current account imbalances), “these percentages would 
appear to imply US assets in the global investor’s portfolio about equal to the market cap weights.”  
Although questions would remain about the implementation and allocations associated with increased 
foreign official holdings – including issues associated with private versus official portfolio allocations and 
competition for funds amongst various international borrowers in a time of higher debt – the relationships 
suggest at face value that “there would be enough money in the world” to meet the financing 
requirements for U.S. Treasuries over the intermediate horizon (through 2020) and under the assumptions 
considered in this analysis.  Uncertainty remains, however, under such a projection whether world 
portfolio allocations would, in fact, adjust sufficiently to accommodate higher shares of U.S. assets.  
Further, such an expansion has limits that ultimately could not be sustained indefinitely over the long run 
and beyond the intermediate horizon considered here. 30 
                                                 
29 CBO (2010(e)) discuss concerns about negative effects on GDP growth and lower potential output. 
30 Similarly, Mann concluded that, in contrast to the implications from the average portfolio percentages, it “looks 
unreasonable” for the required marginal contributions per dollar of new investment that would have to occur for 
holdings of U.S. assets under those increased world portfolio shares.  
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6.  ALTERNATIVE CASES 
 
Although many different alternatives to the base case could be examined, two additional scenarios are 
presented to illustrate how the projections would be affected by alternative outlooks for (1) foreign 
official holdings and (2) sustained higher Federal Reserve holdings (i.e., the domestic monetary base).  
Table 4 presents information on key assumptions and relationships in the scenarios.31   
 
6.1.  Alternative 1: Foreign official holdings kept at maintained percent of U.S. GDP – higher U.S. 
interest rates … 
 
If foreign official holdings were not to increase relative to the size of the U.S. economy over the 
projection period, and were only to grow with the growth in the U.S. economy, long-term Treasury 
security interest rates would be higher than under the base case.  Under such a scenario, foreign official 
holdings, while fixed as a percent of U.S. GDP, would have a substantially lower portfolio share of total 
foreign assets – about 17 percent by 2020 compared to the base case of about 49 percent. 
 
Using the estimated relationships from Section 4.1, point estimates show the 10-year Treasury yield 
would rise relative to the 5½ percent of the base case for 2015-2020 to about 7.1 percent in 2015 and to 
7.9 percent by 2020.32  These estimates reflect the role of the rising structural budget deficit of the base 
case (without the offsetting effect on interest rates from foreign official flows in the base) – as well as the 
endogenous feedback to the structural deficit from higher debt service costs.  Estimates of the resulting 
effect of the higher longer-term Treasury yields on the debt service costs for the budget indicate an 
increase by about $100 billion in 2015 and about $220 billion by 2020, with a cumulative effect on the 
debt of over $1.1 trillion – an additional 5 percent of GDP – by 2020.33 
                                                 
31 The alternative cases considered here are not derived in fully-specified general equilibrium models that would 
account for all of the interactions and changes to the associated underlying economic variables.  As such, the 
scenarios do not represent the complete spectrum of effects or the behavioral and second-order relationships that 
would occur.  The scenarios are intended to be illustrative of the changes and pressures that would occur and not full 
model outcomes or forecasts. 
32 As the original analysis for this paper was being completed, the IMF (2010) released a report examining special 
issues for the United States, with a section that addressed “The Financing of U.S. Federal Budget Deficits.”  That 
analysis used rules of thumb reflecting the results of Laubach (2009) – and similar to those estimated here – to 
examine the potential effect from higher U.S. debt on borrowing costs, with results suggesting an increase of 50 to 
150 basis points.  That range is lower than the estimated effects presented in this paper.  The analysis of this paper 
explicitly estimates and addresses the relationships and roles for alternative sources of financing – in particular 
foreign official vs. private – and how those relative allocations would affect long-term Treasury rates. 
33 These estimates were made in a small model for debt service budget effects from higher interest rates (a notable 
assumption used was that new debt issuance was assumed to keep the relative maturity structure stable).  The model 
was tested to successfully replicate the CBO’s estimates presented in CBO (2011).  Note that the estimates presented 
in the text are not for an equivalent shift of interest rates across the term structure (as in the CBO tabular estimates), 
but rather for an increase in intermediate- and longer-term rates relative to the short-term rate. 
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6.2.  Alternative 2: Faster sustained growth of Federal Reserve holdings of U.S. Treasuries – higher 
inflation, interest rates, and lower exchange value of the dollar … 
 
The final scenario presented here considers the general effects from sustained higher growth of Federal 
Reserve holdings of Treasuries – an illustration of a partial “monetization of the debt.”34  The scenario is 
based on examining the general pressures that would arise from sustained higher growth of Federal 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities over time, and the implications for inflation, interest rates, and the 
international position and flows as examined in the other scenarios of this analysis.  It uses standard 
“monetarist” relationships that illustrate the long-run pressures that would be exerted on key variables.  
Under those assumptions, a sustained increase in the rate of growth of the Federal Reserve balance sheet 
(increase in monetary base growth) by one percent per year relative to the base case passes through one-
for-one to the money supply, and one-for-one to inflation being higher by one percent per year.  In turn, 
the higher inflation rate passes through to nominal interest rates being higher by one percentage point, and 
the exchange value of the dollar declines by an additional one percent per year relative to the base case, 
maintaining relative parity relationships.  For purposes of the monetary policy rule, the target inflation 
rate also increases by one percent.  We assume no change to the projection for real GDP growth, and no 
change in real net exports as the changes in prices and the exchange value of the dollar lead to no change 
in real prices for exports and imports.  Reflecting the higher rate of inflation, nominal GDP growth is one 
percentage point higher per year.  Although short-run dynamics and transitions could be very different 
from these assumptions, the restrictive assumptions meet the intent of the projections being to examine 
the general implications and pressures from indefinitely sustained higher growth of Fed Treasury 
holdings.  Foreign official holdings of Treasuries are assumed to grow at the rate necessary to maintain 
the same Treasury yield term spread of the base case (and offsetting effects from the inflation-induced 
changes to the structural budget deficit as a percent of GDP); nominal interest rates change by the one 
percentage point increase associated with the increase in the inflation rate.   
 
CBO (2011) published the estimated effects on the budget from changes in economic assumptions; here 
the budget effects of a one percentage point increase in the inflation rate are used, a cumulative effect 
through 2020 of $780 billion.35  The budget effects from higher inflation are small relative to the increase 
in nominal GDP; the debt-to-GDP ratio is lower in 2020, at 88 percent of GDP under the alternative 
scenario, compared to 94 percent in the base case.  The debt-to-GDP ratio is often viewed as the metric by 
                                                 
34 Some analysts and researchers view monetization of the debt as an option for reducing the “burden” from high 
government debt levels.  See, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2009); and Mankiw (2009), who stated:   “A little 
more inflation might be preferable to rising unemployment or a series of fiscal measures that pile on debt 
bequeathed to future generations.” 
35 Higher inflation results in higher spending – for discretionary programs, indexed mandatory spending, and higher 
interest costs – with the spending increases only partly offset by rising nominal receipts. 
  33
which the debt burden is measured (see, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2009)), focusing on the 
value of the stock of debt relative to the production flow in the United States.  With the large share of 
foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury debt, and with ongoing U.S. deficits and debt turnover to be financed, it 
is important to also recognize the role of payments to foreign holders of U.S. Treasuries and the impact on 
domestic national income relative to production.  In the alternative scenario being addressed here of 
higher inflation and interest rates, the continued high foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury debt combined 
with higher nominal interest rates result in higher payments to foreign holders of U.S. Treasury debt than 
under the base case – and higher relative to GDP (4.5 percent of GDP in the alternative compared to 4.3 
percent in the base case).  Overall net international income flows are more negative – at -2.8 percent of 
GDP in the alternative scenario compared to the -2.4 percent of the base case – so the notion of 
“improvement” in the debt burden is slightly mitigated when accounting for the income flows.  Note also, 
that because of the higher U.S. nominal GDP and the greater decline in the value of the dollar in this 
alternative scenario, the U.S. net international debt position relative to GDP is lower at about 41 percent 
of GDP in 2020 compared to the 44 percent of the base case.  The results show that higher inflation would 
reduce the relative stocks of government debt and net international debt measured relative to GDP, but 
with the potential for higher net international income payments abroad and the resulting lower national 
income relative to GDP. 
   
7.  CLOSING DISCUSSION 
 
The analysis and results presented in this paper confirm the fundamental challenges associated with 
funding U.S. deficits and debt, with a specific recognition of the role of – and interactions with – 
international financial assets and flows.  We reiterate that the results and scenarios presented in this paper 
are not “forecasts” per se, but rather projections that illustrate some fundamental relationships for the U.S. 
fiscal outlook in an international setting, and specifically the role of international financial flows and 
portfolio adjustments.  The base case and alternative scenarios are descriptive of the relationships 
involved regarding alternative assumptions about foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities for 
financing U.S. debt.  New empirical evidence was presented that explicitly accounted for the roles of U.S. 
structural budget deficits, expanded holdings of long-term securities by the Federal Reserve, and foreign 
official holdings of U.S. Treasuries in determining Treasury security interest rates; the empirical results 
are used to examine, in particular, the implications of changing relative magnitudes of foreign official 
holdings for Treasury interest rates.  Two alternative scenarios considered (1) how the projected outlook 
would be affected if foreign official holdings of Treasuries did not increase substantially as assumed in 
the base case, and (2) the effects on the projections from assuming the Federal Reserve (Fed) would 
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increase the rate of growth for its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities over time, i.e., a partial 
monetization of the debt. 
 
The results from the cases examined highlight several specific challenges and potential tradeoffs.  The 
results indicate that current private and public economic forecasts (and as used in our base case) implicitly 
require that foreign official holdings continually increase – and by large amounts – to fund continued 
deficits and to keep longer-term interest rates as low as assumed in those forecasts.  Yet, historically, 
large increases in foreign official holdings have tended to be associated with management of currency 
values and ongoing U.S. trade deficits.  Those relationships pose a potential problem for assuming both 
relatively low interest rates and ongoing improvement in the U.S. trade deficit with, at the same time, 
continued budget deficits and growing debt.  Further, if the share of foreign financial flows devoted to 
U.S. Treasuries increases, then the potential exists for “crowding out” of foreign flows that have 
historically been a key source for funding domestic investment.  The question arises, then, as to how 
domestic investment and potential output growth would be affected.  Finally, although the general 
interpretation presented here and by other researchers is that the world portfolio could potentially 
accommodate the “required” increase in foreign funding of U.S. Treasury securities, it remains an open 
question whether such an increase would be forthcoming.  Ultimately, measures that reduce the deficit by 
changing the trajectory of tax revenues and spending, particularly in the latter years of the horizon we 
consider and beyond, would mitigate the concerns about the financing of the U.S. budget and current 
account deficits. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
AIZENMAN, JOSHUA AND NANCY MARION (2009), “Using Inflation to Erode the U.S. Public Debt,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15562, December. 
 
AUERBACH, ALAN AND WILLIAM GALE (2009), “The Economic and Fiscal Crises: 2009 and Beyond, An 
Update,” Brookings Institution, September. 
 
BERGSTEN, C. FREDERICK (2009), ed., The Long-Term International Economic Position of the US, 
Institute for International Economics, April. 
 
BERNANKE, B. (2005), “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit.” The Homer Jones 
Lecture, St. Louis, Missouri, April 14. 
 
BERTAUT, CAROL C., STEVEN B. KAMIN, AND CHARLES P. THOMAS (2009), “How Long Can The 
Unsustainable U.S. Current Account Deficit Be Sustained?”  IMF Staff Papers, 56. 
 
  35
BLACK, FISHER AND ROBERT LITTERMAN (1992), “Global Portfolio Optimization,” Financial Analysts 
Journal, September/October. 
 
BLANCHARD, OLIVIER, FRANCESCO GIAVAZZI AND FILIPA SA (2005), “The U.S. Current Account Deficit 
and the Dollar,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 11137, February. 
 
BLUE CHIP ECONOMIC INDICATORS (2011), Aspen Publishers, October. 
 
BRANSON, WILLIAM H. AND DALE W. HENDERSON (1985), “The Specification and Influence of Asset 
Markets,” in Handbook of International Economics, volume 2, edited by Ronald W. Jones and Peter 
B. Kenen, Elsevier Science Publishers. 
 
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2010), “U.S. International Investment Position at Yearend 2009,” 
June. 
 
CANZONERI, MATTHEW B., ROBERT E. CUMBY, AND BEHZAD T. DIBA (2002), “Should the European 
Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Be Concerned About Fiscal Policy?” Rethinking Stabilization 
Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
 
CHINN, MENZIE (2005), “Getting Serious about the Twin Deficits,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
September. 
 
CHINN, MENZIE, AND JEFFREY FRANKEL (2007), “Debt and Interest Rates:  The U.S. and the Euro Area,” 
January. 
 
CHUNG, HESS, JEAN-PHILIPPE LAFORTE, DAVID REIFSCHNEIDER, AND JOHN C. WILLIAMS (2011), “Have 
We Underestimated the Probability of Hitting the Lower Bound?” Working Paper 2011-01, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, January. 
 
CLINE, WILLIAM R. (2005), The United States as a Debtor Nation, Institute for International Economics, 
September. 
 
CLINE, WILLIAM R. (2009), “Long-Term Fiscal Imbalances, US External Liabilities, and Future Living 
Standards,” in C. Frederick Bergsten, ed., The Long-Term International Economic Position of the US, 
Institute for International Economics, April. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2010(a)), The Budget and Economic Outlook:  Fiscal Years 2010 to 
2020, January. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2010(b)), CBO’s Budgetary Treatment of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, January.  
 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2010(c)), An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for 
Fiscal Year 2011, March. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2010(d)), The Effects of Automatic Stabilizers on the Federal Budget, 
May. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2010(e)), The Long Term Budget Outlook, June. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2010(f)), Federal Debt and the Risk of a Fiscal Crisis, July 27. 
  36
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (2011), The Budget and Economic Outlook:  Fiscal Years 2011 to 
2021, January. 
 
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (2010), Economic Report of the President, February. 
 
EICHENGREEN, BARRY (2006), “Global Imbalances: The New Economy, the Dark Matter, the Savvy 
Investor, and the Standard Analysis," The Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 28, Issue 6, 
September. 
 
ENGEL, CHARLES AND ROGERS, JOHN H. (2006), “The US Current Account Deficit and the Expected 
Share of World Output,” Journal of Monetary Economics 53. 
 
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS (2010), “Minutes of the Meeting of April 27-28, 2010.”  
 
FELDSTEIN, MARTIN (1986), “The Budget Deficit and the Dollar,” NBER Working Paper 1898, April. 
 
GAGNON, JOSEPH E., MATTHEW RASKIN, JULIE REMACHE, AND BRIAN P. SACK (2010), “Large-Scale 
Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work?” FRB of New York Staff Report No. 441, 
March 1. 
 
GALE, WILLIAM G., AND PETER R. ORSZAG (2002), “The Economic Effects of Long-Term Fiscal 
Discipline,” Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Discussion Paper, December. 
 
GALE, WILLIAM G., AND PETER R. ORSZAG (2005), “Budget Deficits, National Saving, and Interest 
Rates,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
 
GREENSPAN, ALAN (2009), “The Fed Didn't Cause the Housing Bubble,” Wall Street Journal, March 11. 
 
GREENSPAN, ALAN (2010), “The Crisis,” Unpublished manuscript presented at Brookings Institute, 
March. 
 
HAMILTON, JAMES D. AND JING (CYNTHIA) WU (2011), “The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary 
Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment,” Manuscript, University of San Diego, February. 
 
HE, GUANGLIANG AND ROBERT LITTERMAN (1999), “The Intuition Behind Black-Litterman Model 
Portfolios,” Goldman Sachs, December. 
 
HIGGINS, MATTHEW, THOMAS KLITGAARD AND CEDRIC TILLE (2005), “The Income Implications of 
Rising U.S. International Liabilities,” Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, December. 
 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2010), United States:  Selected Issues Paper, IMF Country Report 
No. 10/248, July.  
 
KITCHEN, JOHN (2003), “A Note on Interest Rates and Structural Federal Budget Deficits,” Manuscript,   
October. 
 
KITCHEN, JOHN (2007), “Sharecroppers or Shrewd Capitalists? Projections of the U.S. Current Account, 
International Income Flows, and Net International Debt,” Review of International Economics, Vol. 
15, Issue 5, November. 
  37
KOHN, DONALD L. (2009), “Monetary Policy Research and the Financial Crisis:  Strengths and 
Shortcomings.” Speech delivered at the Federal Reserve Conference on Key Developments in 
Monetary Policy, Washington D.C., October 9.  
 
KOURI, PENTTI (1976), "The Exchange Rate and the Balance of Payments in the Short Run and in the 
Long Run: A Monetary Approach," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 78(2). 
 
LAUBACH, THOMAS (2009), “New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt,” 
Journal of the European Economic Association, June. 
 
MANKIW, N. GREGORY (2009), “It May Be Time for the Fed to Go Negative,” New York Times, April 18. 
 
MANN, CATHERINE (1999), Is the U.S. Trade Deficit Sustainable? Washington: DC: Institute for 
International Economics. 
 
MANN, CATHERINE (2009), “International Capital Flows and the Sustainability of the US Current 
Account Deficit,” in C. Frederick Bergsten, ed., The Long-Term International Economic Position of 
the US, Institute for International Economics, April. 
  
MELTZER, ALAN (2009), Interview in Financial Intelligence Report, MoneyNews.com, Vol. 7, no. 12, 
December. 
 
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (2010), Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2011, February. 
 
PAKKO, MICHAEL (1999), “The U.S. Trade Deficit and the ‘New Economy,’” Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review 81(5). 
 
ROUBINI, NOURIEL AND BRAD SETSER (2004), “The US as a Net Debtor: The Sustainability of the US 
External Imbalances,” manuscript, November. 
 
STOCK, JAMES H. AND MARK W. WATSON (2003), “Forecasting Output and Inflation: The Role of Asset 
Prices,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 41, No. 3, September. 
 
TAYLOR, JOHN B. (1993), “Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie Rochester Series on 
Public Policy, 39. 
 
TAYLOR, JOHN B. (2009), “The Financial Crisis and The Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis Of 
What Went Wrong” Working Paper 14631, National Bureau Of Economic Research, January. 
 
WARNOCK, FRANCIS E. AND VERONICA CACDAC WARNOCK (2006), “International Capital Flows and 
U.S. Interest Rates,” NBER Working Paper 12560, October. 
 
WRIGHT, JONATHAN H. (2006), “The Yield Curve and Predicting Recessions,” Staff Working Paper, 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, February. 
 
YELLEN, JANET, (2011) “The Federal Reserve’s Asset Purchase Program,” Speech, Allied Social Science 
Associations Annual Meeting, January 8. 
  
